`_addRewardsForToken` will brick tokens inside the contract

Attacker can extend rewards to near infinity and lower the distribution

`_calcCost` rounds in favor of the user causing insolvency

When users increase their vouch they will receive some part of the fees that thei've paid

Users can manipulate the buy price and buy votes at a lower one

`buyVotes` makes `ReputationMarket` insolvent

Buy fee is much higher than sell fee, causing a discrepency

Users can avoid slashing

`sellVotes` is lacking slippage protection

Any user can steal other user's claims

`claimRoyalties` can be called by our custom contract

LTV of 98% would be extremely dangerous

Portocol fee on liquidations is calculated wrongly

reallocate will revert when using USDT

Chainlink min/max price is not validated

The maximum number of generations is infinite

Number of entities in generation can surpass the 10k number

Griefing attack on seller's airdrop benefits

Wrong minting logic based on total token count across generations

There is no slippage check in the `nuke()` function.

Forger Entities can forge more times than intended

NFTs mature too slowly under default settings.

`Golden God` Tokens can be minted twice per generation

Excess ETH from `forgingFee` can get stuck in `EntityForging` under certain situations

Discrepancy between nfts minted, price of nft when a generation changes & position of `_incrementGeneration()` inside `_mintInternal()` & `_mintNewEntity()`

TraitForgeNft: Generations without a golden god are possible

Single plot can be occupied by multiple renters

in `farmPlots()` an underflow in edge case leading to freeze of funds (NFT)

[H-01] Miscalculation in `_farmPlots` function could lead to a user unable to unstake all NFTs

`GenerateForecastScores` acidentally updates inferences scores

math miscalculation artificially deflates scores

`DripTopicFeeRevenue` drips the internal `topicFeeRevenue` and not the one provided by `GetCurrentTopicWeight`

`GetForecastScoresUntilBlock` can get more score samples than the max allowed

Topics can be activated even if they haven't reached `MinTopicWeight`

`GetCurrentTopicWeight` returns `topicFeeRevenue` without accounting `additionalRevenue`

If old coefficient is bigger than the new one then the reputer has it's coeff reduced more than it should

coefficients math mistakenly calculates the coefficient diff with the same value

WStethRatiosAggregatorV3 will not work properly if the base token is anything but stETH

`ratiosX96Value` rounds in favor of user and not vault

`_sendOrEscrowFunds` will brick LCG funds causing insolvency

`burnSharesToWithdrawEarnings` burns before math, causing the share value to increase

Borrowers can brick the commitment group pool

Borrowers can claim part of their interest

liquidateDefaultedLoanWithIncentive sends the collateral to the wrong account

`acceptFundsForAcceptBid` collateral check does the wrong math

Owner can still front-run users and increase the fee to profit

Borrowers can surpass `liquidityThresholdPercent` and borrow to near 100% of the principal

Utilization math should include `liquidityThresholdPercent`

APRs are lower than they should

When borrowers repay USDS, it is sent to the wrong address, allowing anyone to burn Protocol Owned Liquidity and build bad debt for USDS

First Liquidity provider can claim all initial pool rewards

No proposal time limit traps sponsors of unpopular proposals

Adversary can prevent updating price feed addresses by creating poisonous proposals ending in `_confirm`

Remove Liquidity has missing reserve1 DUST check, which can make reserve1 to be less than DUST

Absence of autonomous mechanism for `selling collateral assets in the external market in exchange for USDS` will cause undercollateralization during market crashes and will cause USDS to depeg.

No slippage protection for Market functions

Attacker can drain all ETH from AuctionDemo when block.timestamp == auctionEndTime

Attacker can reenter to mint all the collection supply

Multiple mints can brick any form of `salesOption` 3 mintings

Bidder Funds Can Become Unrecoverable Due to 1 second Overlap in `participateToAuction()` and `claimAuction()`

getPrice `salesOption` 2 can round down to the lower barrier, skipping the last time period

If an airdrop happens before a mint the price could skyrocket

Auction winner can prevent payments via `safeTransferFrom` callback

Allocator can allocate as much voice credits as he wants

`_qv_allocate` uses wrong math to add the `totalCredits`

You can deposit for other users really small amount to DoS them

The settle feature will be broken if attacker arbitrarily transfer collateral tokens to the PerpetualAtlanticVaultLP

Improper precision of strike price calculation can result in broken protocol

`UniV3LiquidityAMO::recoverERC721` will cause `ERC721` tokens to be permanently locked in `rdpxV2Core`

Missing slippage parameter on Uniswap `addLiquidity()` function

Inaccurate swap amount calculation in ReLP leads to stuck tokens and lost liquidity

LMPVaultRouterBase will charge a user 2x the deposit amount

The swap function within BaseAsyncSwapper will not work, rendering liquidation impossible.

Chainlick price not fully checked, possibility of stale data if sequencer is down

function `restructureCapTable()` in Equity.sol not functioning as expected