Incorrect Token Amount Tracking in updateParticipation Function

Incorrect Logic in onlyOperator Modifier Leading to Denial-of-Service for Authorized Operators Across Critical Functions

Minting zero tokens when underlyingToken is not Ether in cashIn()

Inconsistent Fee Calculation Leads to pay user more then intended !

Missing Slippage Protection in Vote Selling

Inadequate Restriction on Compromised Addresses Fails to Protect User Data Integrity

Early Claimers will lose their rewards for the later valid epochs of a distribution and remaining funds will be locked in the contract forever !

Vultisig whitelisting can be bypassed by anyone

Malicious User can call `lockOnBehalf` repeatedly extend a users `unlockTime`, removing their ability to withdraw previously locked tokens

Invalid validation allows users to unlock early

`executeWithdraw` may be blocked if any of the users are blacklisted from the `baseToken`

NFTs can be transferred even if StakeAtRisk remains, so the user's win cannot be recorded on the chain due to underflow, and can recover past losses that can't be recovered(steal protocol's token)

Auction contract could be paused maliciously !

Attacker can drain all ETH from AuctionDemo when block.timestamp == auctionEndTime

Test addresses and incorrect interface in code prevent integration with UniswapV3 and Camelot

Pools will fail to handle fee-on-transfer token accounting accurately

Malicious lender can scam borrower by increasing the interest way too much after loan being issued and take borrower's collateral.

The peg stability module can be compromised by forcing lowerDepeg to revert.

There's no functionalities for redeeming DAI for USSD in the contract.