Misuse of Fenwick Tree Index in DepositQueue.cancelDepositRequest()

Wrong amount is minted to user when they deposit into the lending pool

Attackers can get most of RAACToken rewards by withdrawing dust amount from StabilityPool multiple times

RToken is Not Interest Bearing Due to Broken Liquidity Index Calculation

Incorrect Debt Scaling Leading to Protocol Solvency Risk

Incorrect Return Values and Double Scaling in `RToken.burn` Function Leads to Denial of Service

Liquidation Cannot Be Closed Even With Healthy Position Due To Strict Debt Check

There is no logic checking for RAACNFT price staleness before minting it

No check for sequencer uptime can lead to Zeno auctions being executed at lower prices or may result in incomplete auctions

Treasury Contract Deposit Function Can Be Frontrun To Deny Protocol Operations

Auction can be DoSed through bid manipulation leading to guaranteed FAILED_POOL_SALE_LIMIT state

USDA/USDT Redemption Price Manipulation Due to User-Controlled Price Parameters