Wrong refundExecutionFee in _handleReturn

Deposits on long one leverage vault don't actually finalize the flow, leading to a Denial of Service (DoS)

Loss of fee refund due to premature state deletion in `PerpetualVault::_handleReturn` function

Wrong index causes last depositor to always get execution fee refund if cancelFlow is called by keeper to cancel a withdrawal

Incorrect set up and logic of `referralInfoMap` in `SystemConfig::updateReferrerInfo` function

TokenManager - Unlimited withdraw

Taker of bid offer will loss assets without any benefit if he calls the DeliveryPlace::settleAskMaker() for partial settlement.

Native token withdrawal fails until manually approved

`DeliveryPlace::settleAskTaker` Has Incorrect Access Control

Malicious user can drain protocol by bypassing `ASK` offer abortion validation in `Turbo` mode

The `DeliveryPlace::settleAskTaker()` function mistakenly uses `makerInfo.tokenAddress` to update the `TokenBalanceType.PointToken` in the `userTokenBalanceMap` mapping, leading to a critical error.

[H-4] The function `PreMarkets::listOffer` charges an incorrect collateral amount, allowing users to manipulating collateral rates and drain the protocol's funds

Wrong parameter passed in `TradingAccount::deductAccountMargin` function that results in excess margin withdrawal

User can withdraw all collateral when a position has enough profit so if liquidated no collateral can be deducted

Users won't liquidate positions because the logic used to calculate the liquidator's profit is incorrect

Fragmentation fee is not taken if user compensates with newly created position

```_update``` function in ```JalaPair.sol``` will revert when ```priceCumulativeLast```overflows

All tokens can be stolen from `VirtualAccount` due to missing access modifier

QVBaseStrategy.sol

Sandwich attack to steal all ERC-20 tokens in the Fees contract

The `borrow` and `refinance` functions can be front-run by the pool lender to set high interest rates

Lender fails to giveLoan because of inconsistent length between `loadIds` and `poolIds`

Business Logic: Protocol Liquidation Arithmetic