In `transferVesting`, the `grantorVesting.releaseRate` is calculated incorrectly, which leads to the sender being able to unlock more tokens than were initially locked.

Incorrect referral fee calculations

Missing option to remove tokens from the `isTokenSupport` mapping can result in huge financial loss for users and the protocol

It is possible to avoid paying the `protocolFee`

Stakers who are part of the sequencerSet and exit on the L1 may not be able to claim the comissions of the last epoch(s) when they were active

Delegators can lose their rewards when a delegator has removed a delegatee and claims all of his rewards before delegating again to a previous removed delegatee.

Positive PnL is lost for all parties when liquidating an account, potentially causing that the MarginCollateralRecipient ends up receiving way less USD value than what it could have received.

Market Disruption and Financial Loss Post-Liquidation

Wrong parameter passed in `TradingAccount::deductAccountMargin` function that results in excess margin withdrawal

Insufficient checks to confirm the correct status of the sequencerUptimeFeed

A malicious User can DOS all offchain orders making them unexecutable and leaving the protocol in an insolvent state. Also all offchain Trades can also be DOSed for honest parties that do not meet the fillorder requirements (no try and catch)

Liquidating positions of different accounts for the same market on the same block.timestamp uses the same fundingFeePerUnit regardless of the computed MarkPrice based on the size of the position been liqudiated.

QA Report - 0xStalin - Low Severities

Functions calling `verifyReport` to verify offchain prices from chainlink will fail

Deleting CollateralTypes from the CollateralLiquidationPriority allows traders to be liquidated for free and getting back their full collateral as if they were not liquidated.

UpgradeBranch.sol does not use _disableInitializers()

Missing expiration check in `Data Streams` report validation allows the use of expired report data

When transfering the NFT associated to a TradingAccount, the old owner can grief the new owner by leaving an opened MarketOrder that will be executed even though the old owner is not the owner of the TradingAccount.

Users won't liquidate positions because the logic used to calculate the liquidator's profit is incorrect

When `sellCreditMarket()` is called to sell credit for a specific cash amount, the protocol might receive a lower swapping fee than expected.

Fragmentation fee is not taken if user compensates with newly created position

Credit can be sold forcibly as `forSale` setting can be ignored via Compensate

Users can not to buy/sell minimum credit allowed due to exactAmountIn condition

LiquidateWithReplacement does not charge swap fees on the borrower

`SettleLongPremium` is incorrectly implemented: premium should be deducted instead of added

Wrong leg `chunkKey` calculation in `haircutPremia` function

Wrong use of nftID to check if a Power farm position is an Aave position

Incorrect bad debt accounting can lead to a state where the `claimFeesBeneficial` function is permanently bricked and no new incentives can be distributed, potentially locking pending and future protocol fees in the `FeeManager` contract

Borrowers can DoS liquidations by repaying as little as 1 share.

Withdrawing uncollateralized deposits is possible even though the position is in liquidation mode

Exiting a farm on mainnet assumes a peg of 1:1 when swapping stETH for ETH

Whitelised accounts can be forcefully DoSed from buying curveTokens during the presale

Attack to make ````CurveSubject```` to be a ````HoneyPot````

Unrestricted claiming of fees due to missing balance updates in `FeeSplitter`

Unauthorized Access to setCurves Function

The userGaugeProfitIndex is not set correctly, allowing an attacker to receive rewards without waiting

The creation of bad debt (`mark-down` of Credit) can force other loans in auction to also create bad debt

Repayers using EOA accounts can be affected if baddebt is generated when they are repaying loans

Replay attack to suddenly offboard the re-onboarded lending term

LendingTerm::debtCeiling() can return wrong debt as the min() is evaluated incorrectly

Lenders can escape the blacklisting of their accounts because they can move their MarketTokens to different accounts and gain the WithdrawOnly Role on any account they want

Borrower has no way to update `maxTotalSupply` of `market` or close market.

Protocol markets are incompatible with rebasing tokens

Blocked accounts keep earning interest contrary to the WhitePaper

if the Virtual Account's owner is a Contract Account (multisig wallet), attackers can gain control of the Virtual Accounts by gaining control of the same owner's address in a different chain

Incorrect source address decoding in RootBridgeAgent and BranchBridgeAgent's _requiresEndpoint breaks LayerZero communication

Depositors could lost all their depositted tokens (including the hTokens) if their address is blacklisted in one of all the depositted underlyingTokens

If RootBridgeAgent.lzReceiveNonBlocking reverts internally, the native token sent by relayer to RootBridgeAgent is left in RootBridgeAgent

Investors claiming their maxDeposit by using the LiquidityPool.deposit() will cause that other users won't be able to claim their maxDeposit/maxMint

Admin can't burn tokens from blocklisted addresses because of a check in _beforeTokenTransfer

`rngComplete` function should only be called by `rngAuctionRelayer`

Liquidators can be tricked to operate with LiquidationPairs that were deployed using the LiquidationPairFactory but they configured the LiquidationSource as a fake malicious contract

High - Funds can be lost if any participant is blacklisted

Increasing reserves breaks PrizePool accounting

Delegated amounts can be forcefully removed from anyone in the TwabController

`Vault.mintYieldFee` FUNCTION CAN BE CALLED BY ANYONE TO MINT `Vault Shares` TO ANY RECIPIENT ADDRESS

Silent overflow could alter computation when calculating the vaultPortion in the PrizePool contract

`VaultFactory` allows deployment of vaults with non-authentic `TwabController` and `PrizePool`

[HD05] Magnetar contract has no approval checking

Ability to steal user funds and increase collateral share infinitely in BigBang and Singularity

Tokens can be stolen from other users who have approved Magnetar

Anybody can buy collateral on behalf of other users without having any allowance using the multiHopBuyCollateral()

User's assets can be stolen when removing them from the Singularity market through the Magnetar contract

`MagnetarV2#burst` double counts `msg.value` for `TOFT_WRAP` operation, making the transaction revert unless the user overpays

In the Vault contract, the _update_debt_() function doesn't accrue interests even though the debt_token has outsanding debt

Executing DCA Orders can fall in a permanent DoS for fee-on-transfer tokens & tokens implementing the approval race condition

Incorrectly reading the offset from the received data parameter to get the depositNonce in the BranchBridgeAgent::anyFallback() function

Accessing the incorrect offset to get the nonce when flag is 0x06 in RootBridgeAgent::anyExecute() will lead to mark as executed incorrect nonces and could potentially cause a DoS

Multiple issues with decimal scaling will cause incorrect accounting of hTokens and underlying tokens

Use of slot0 to get sqrtPriceLimitX96 can lead to price manipulation.

Inconsistently reading the encoded parameters received in the _sParams argument in the BranchBridgeAgent::clearTokens()

Chainlink's latestRoundData return stale or incorrect result is not validated

An Attacker can steal all the collateral by abusing the rebalance function and causing imbalances on the Uniswap Pool

Incorrectly calculation of the price in the StableOracleDAI Contract returns the price scaled up by an incorrect magnitude

Using incorrect addresses to initialize the Oracles

No deadline and no slippage protection when doing swaps to rebalance the pool

Chainlink's latestRoundData return stale or incorrect result is not validated

Not using eMode's risk parameters configurations to calculate the maxBorrow/repayAmount when eMode is activated

Using a deprecated Chainlink function to pull the asset's price from the Chainlink Oracle

Functions implementing the `invokeApprove()` of the Invoke Library could revert for non-standard token like USDT

`RiskFund.swapPoolsAsset` does not allow user to supply deadline, which may cause swap revert

Borrower can cause a DoS by frontrunning a liquidation and repaying as low as 1 wei of the current debt

Bad Debt in PoolLens.sol#getPoolBadDebt() is not calculated correctly in USD

RewardsManager fails to validate `pool_` when updating exchange rates allowing rewards to be drained

Unsafe casting from `uint256` to `uint128` in RewardsManager

No use of _safeMint() as safe guard for users when minting a new ClubNFT

Use a safe transfer helper library for ERC20 transfers

Swapping the liquidated collateral for USDC when running the JOJOFlashloan():FlashLoanLiquidate.sol is susceptible to sandwich attack that could mess up the rewards of the liquidators

Reward accounting is incorrect in BathBuddy contract