Updating `lastRewardIndex` causes developer and liquidity providers to lose rewards.

Not updating `RewardIndex` before setting a new `mintRate` can lead to losses or extra gains to LPs and developer.

Lack of nonces for users allows for Signature replays, allowing accumulation of `votingPower` with the same valid signature for a given batch.

Fee Distribution can be Dos'd by malicious receiver (BatchSender or refundReceiptient)

Subtracting currencyAmount from TokenAmount in `launch.sol::updateParticipation` can DO'S refunds.

Last buy might charge the wrong fee

Users can claim more that their actual allotment

Penalty fees can be shared among future farms or expired farms, risks of exploits

User is unable to claim their reward for the expanded epochs if farm is expanded

Subtraction in `variance()` will revert due to underflow

Platform fees withdrawal will sweep oracle agents earned fees

Sequential Fee Calculations Lead to Lost Platform Revenue Due to Precision Loss

Boost Creators can prevent the protocol from getting the Default 10% of the claim fee its supposed to receive

Formulaic Error Rounds Down Causing Total Loss Of Funds For Bid Takers During Abort

Malicious user can drain protocol by bypassing `ASK` offer abortion validation in `Turbo` mode

Missing check for aborted origin offer allows bid takers to relist unbacked offers

Number of entities in generation can surpass the 10k number

Wrong minting logic based on total token count across generations

Malicious user can prevent `rewardData.perodfinish` from ending by calling `TempleGoldStaking::distributeRewards()` before the end of the reward duration when no starter is set.