Faulty fee logic in `approveRedeemRequest()` can dilute YUSD value

`SymmVesting#addLiquidity()` might revert due to wrong sanity check

Anyone can dilute reward distribution rate and postpone the end of reward distribution

Any ether withdrawing functions could be DoS'ed due to incorrect fund calculation in `ReputationMarket#buyVotes()`

The balance of vouch is less than expected due to the incorrect fee calculation

Borrower has no way to update `maxTotalSupply` of `market` or close market.

No lender is able to exit even after the market is closed

`FixedTermLoanHooks` allow Borrower to update Annual Interest before end of the "Fixed Term Period"

`RedemptionVaultWithBUIDL#redeemInstant‎()` doesn't implement BUIDL balance threshold check

`ManageableVault` does not provide any function to allow `tokensReceiver` to be updated

`RedemptionVaultWithBUIDL#redeemInstant()` does not work due to an incorrect function call

`vestTokens` bug in MultiFeeDistribution.sol causes new incentives to erase previous incentives

AuraVault inherits AccessControl BUT does not call the _setupRole() function in it's constructor to set the initial roles, this leads to a complete DOS of the important claim function rendering the contract unable to claim rewards

`PoolV3#repayCreditAccount()` use incorrect share converting function to calculate profit and loss

Incorrect address is used as `spender` for ERC20 permit signature verification

`lastRPS` could be set to `0` accidentally

Users of a vault can steal other user's rewards when one vault's `lastRewardTime` differs from another vault's `lastRewardTime`

In CDPVault::liquidatePositionBadDebt(), the calculation of `loss` is incorrect.

PositionAction.decreaseLever() fails to consider the loan fee in Flashlender when calculating loanAmount, as a result, the functionanlity will not work when protocolFee != 0.

Incorrect calculation of `newCumulativeIndex` in function `calcDecrease`

Malicious actor can abuse the minimum shares check in `StakingLPEth` and cause DoS or locked funds for the last user that withdraws

The last item of `max_locked_nfts` in `VotingEscrow` cannot be marked as max_lock disabled by calling `VotingEscrow#disable_max_lock()`

Anyone calling `exerciseVe()` or `exerciseLp()` could suffer a sandwich attack or a loss on the paymentToken due to the lack of slippage protection

Undistributed gauge reward might be locked forever when `pauseGauge()` is called to kill gauge

The owner of `veNFT` could suffer a DOS attack when transferring, withdrawing or minting their `veNFT` tokens

`ve_supply` is updated incorrectly

Users won't liquidate positions because the logic used to calculate the liquidator's profit is incorrect

When `sellCreditMarket()` is called to sell credit for a specific cash amount, the protocol might receive a lower swapping fee than expected.

Neither `sellCreditMarket‎()` nor `compensate‎()` checks whether the credit position to be sold is allowed for sale

Size uses wrong source to query available liquidity on Aave, resulting in borrow and lend operations being bricked upon mainnet deployment

Multicall does not work as intended

Anyone can prolong the yield distribution period to dilute the staker's reward

ITO liquidity provider might receive less $ZVE than expected due to incorrect calculation

`claimRewards()` might revert due to Incorrect token transferring

Incorrect subtraction in `ZivoeRewardsVesting#revokeVestingSchedule()`

Yield distribution period in `OCL_ZVE` can be bypassed

`OCL_ZVE#pushToLockerMulti()` is unlikely to succeed due to the failure of assertion

The yield rewards obtained though `OCL_ZVE` could be prevented from being distributed

An earner can still continue earning even after being removed from the approved list.

Holders array can be manipulated by transferring or burning with amount 0, stealing rewards or bricking certain functions

`LiquidInfrastructureERC20.sol` disapproved holders keep part of the supply, diluting approved holders revenue.

User can evade `liquidation` by depositing the minimum of tokens and gain time to not be liquidated

Development Team might receive less SALT because there is no access control on `VestingWallet#release()`

Incorrect calculation to check remaining ratio after reward in StableConfig.sol

No proposal time limit traps sponsors of unpopular proposals

changeWallets() can be confirmed immediately after proposalWallets() by manipulating activeTimelock beforehand

Adversary can prevent updating price feed addresses by creating poisonous proposals ending in `_confirm`

SALT staker can get extra voting power by simply unstaking their xSALT

Impossible to change managed wallets with `proposeWallets` after first rejection

If there is only one USDS borrower, he can never be liquidated

The userGaugeProfitIndex is not set correctly, allowing an attacker to receive rewards without waiting

Users staking via the `SurplusGuildMinter` can be immediately slashed when staking into a gauge that had previously incurred a loss

Wrong ProfitManager in GuildToken, will always revert for other types of gauges leading to bad debt

Re-triggering the `canOffboard[term]` flag to bypass the DAO vote of the lending term offboarding mechanism

The gauge status wasn't checked before reducing the user's gauge weight.

SurplusGuildMinter.getReward() is susceptible to DoS due to unbounded loop

Anyone can prolong the time for the rewards to get distributed

Owner cannot withdraw all interest due to wrong calculation of accrued interest in WithdrwaCarry

No slippage protection for Market functions

Users will lose rewards when buying new tokens if they already own some tokens

Attacker can drain all ETH from AuctionDemo when block.timestamp == auctionEndTime

Attacker can reenter to mint all the collection supply

Adversary can block `claimAuction()` due to push-strategy to transfer assets to multiple bidders

Auction winner can prevent payments via `safeTransferFrom` callback

``FULL_RESTRICTED`` Stakers can bypass restriction through approvals

Borrower has no way to update `maxTotalSupply` of `market` or close market.

No lender is able to exit even after the market is closed

`FixedTermLoanHooks` allow Borrower to update Annual Interest before end of the "Fixed Term Period"

Array Length of `tickTracking_ ` Can be Purposely Increased to Brick Minting and Burning of Most Users' Liquidity Positions

Prime.sol - User can claim Prime token without having any staked XVS, because his `stakedAt` isn't reset whenever he is issued an irrevocable token.

Cached `DOMAIN_SEPARATOR` is incorrect for tranche tokens potentially breaking permit integrations

TWO DIFFERENT TRANSACTIONS CAN RESULT IN THE SAME `txnHash` VALUE THUS BREAKING THE APPROVAL PROCESS OF TRANSACTION MINTING

All bridged funds will be lost for the users using the account abstraction wallet