Self-liquidation with `receive_a_token = true` bypasses collateral seizure via `from == to` self-transfer in `transfer_on_liquidation`, socializing residual debt to reserve deficit

Same-Asset Borrow Positions Can Become Insolvent With No Working Liquidation Path

Zero-balance collateral opt-in can make unhealthy positions unliquidatable

Every flash liquidation permanently drains the debt-asset reserve, making depositors unable to withdraw their funds

Users can bypass the first deposit check

Reserve factor changes do not affect treasury accrual until an unrelated rate-recalc path runs

Inactive collateral remains counted for new borrowing while liquidation and withdrawal reject the same reserve as `AssetNotActive`

Prepared Flash Liquidation Can Bypass Collateral Reserve Pause

PaymentBurn direct-step debt-direction mismatch allows source-issued IOU liability creation

Cross-Group Debt Wrongfully Triggers Borrow ADL for Group-0 Borrowers

A depositor will siphon deposit-mining rewards from other liquidity miners

Variable Overwrite in checkPoolAndGetCenterPrice() Creates Dead-Code Deviation Check, Leaving All V3 Protocol-Owned Liquidity Operations Unprotected

MoneyMarket Withdraw Mismatch Lets Attackers Steal From Pooled Liquidity

Liquidator can extract excess collateral by spot-steering D3 liquidation composition (oracle/spot basis drift)

Missing access control in `WERC7575Vault` allows unauthorized withdrawals