Interest Calculation is bricked and interest is never accured in `_update_debt` function

Interested calculated is ampliefied by multiple of 1000 in `_debt_interest_since_last_update`

_calc_min_amount_out is ieffective in execute_dca_order function and exposes user to unlimited slippage and user funds can be drained,

Rewards for initial period can be lost in all of the synthetix derivative contracts

User will be forced liquidated

`getUnderlyingPrice()` will return the wrong price for asset if underlying aggregator hits minAnswer

`getUnderlyingPrice()` might return stale or incorrect results

Price calculation in `getSlots` and `_initializeStrategy` is susceptible to flashloan exploits

Possible precision loss in `_checkpositionsRange` function

Potential Precision Loss in `poolBorrow` function

[M-01] Some functions in Talos contracts does not allow user to supply slippage and deadline, which may cause swap revert

Lack of slippage protection can lead to significant loss of user funds

`getPriceFromChainlink()` doesn't check If Arbitrum sequencer is down in Chainlink feeds

`PriceOrcale` will return the wrong price for asset if underlying aggregator hits minAnswer

`PriceOracle's` `latestRoundData` might return stale or incorrect results

`USSDRebalancer.sol` is easy is manipulate due to how how it calculates price in `getOwnValuation` function

Missing deadline checks allow pending transactions to be maliciously executed

Burn and mint functions are public

StableOracleWETH will return the wrong price for asset if underlying aggregator hits minAnswer

Oracle data feed can be outdated yet used anyways

There isn't any redeem function in the code

USE LATESTROUNDDATA INSTEAD OF LATESTANSWER TO RUN MORE VALIDATIONS

Missing checks for whether Arbitrum Sequencer is active

`RiskFund.swapPoolsAsset` does not allow user to supply deadline, which may cause swap revert