The precision loss in _addRewardsForToken function will cause a partial loss of rewards

In the withdraw function, the code erroneously uses amountOut0 (instead of the correct amountOut1) to calculate repayment amounts.

The updateParticipation function incorrectly updates the total tokens requested.

DOS on redeems tokens due to underflow in collateralLevel computation

lastCumulativeRate is not updated before calculating borrowerDebt

Incorrect calculation of totalVolumeOfBorrowersAmountinWei when withdraw Collateral from the protocol

LastEthprice is not updated after the user deposits collateral into the protocol

After the buyOrder is completed, the order creator does not receive the NFT

Users who turns malicious can drain incentives by lend to themselves

User cannot redeem stake tokens

Users can avoid paying borrowing fees

User cannot withdraw stakingToken due to incorrect calculation of _totalSupply

malicious users can deposit 0 amount of rewards to lower the rewardRate， which will result in loss of rewards for the normal users

Unexpected revert during announce and execute delayed orders

User can abuse of settleFundingFees method to prevent being liquidated

convertToShares method calculation is not accurate

Calculation of the claimable amount is not accurate

getWeightedPoolTokenPrice() method in BalancerPoolTokenPrice.sol wrongly assumes that all of the weighted pools uses totalSupply()

Using the predicted value as Minimum amount of reward to receive may result in user losses

Wrong auctionPrice used in calculating BPF to determine bond reward (or penalty)