Protocol allows creating broken tricrypto CPMM pools

Pool creators can manipulate the slippage calculation for liquidity providers

`withdraw_liquidity` lacks slippage protection

Stablepools return wrong price when they do not converge

Position's owed fees should allow underflow but it reverts instead, resulting in locked funds

Missing `lower<upper` check in `mint_position`

update_emergency_council_7_D_0_C_1_C_58() updates nft manager instead of emergency council

`get_fee_growth_inside` in `tick.rs` should allow for `underflow`/`overflow` but doesn't

Parameter Misordering in Fee Collection Function Causes Denial of Service and Fee Loss

No slippage control when withdrawing a position leads to loss of funds

Users are incorrectly refunded when liqudity is insufficient

Unintended under/overflow of the amount already swapped in/out due to unmatching logic

No related function to set fee_protocol

Tokens are pulled from users without verifying pool status contrary to requirement

It's still not possible to set pool's protocol fees

Position's owed fees should allow underflow but it reverts instead, resulting in locked funds

Missing `lower<upper` check in `mint_position`

update_emergency_council_7_D_0_C_1_C_58() updates nft manager instead of emergency council

`get_fee_growth_inside` in `tick.rs` should allow for `underflow`/`overflow` but doesn't

Parameter Misordering in Fee Collection Function Causes Denial of Service and Fee Loss

No slippage control when withdrawing a position leads to loss of funds

Users are incorrectly refunded when liqudity is insufficient

Unintended under/overflow of the amount already swapped in/out due to unmatching logic

No related function to set fee_protocol

Tokens are pulled from users without verifying pool status contrary to requirement

It's still not possible to set pool's protocol fees

`PanopticFactory` uses spot price when deploying new pools, resulting in liquidity manipulation when minting

An attacker can crash the cluster system by sending an HTTP request with a huge timeout

An attacker can bloat the Pink runtime storage with zero costs

[M09] No slippage check in `remove_liquidity` function in omnipool can lead to slippage losses during liquidity withdrawal.

When `DecentBridgeExecutor.execute` fails, funds will be sent to a random address

Anyone can update the address of the Router in the DcntEth contract to any address they would like to set.

DecentEthRouter.sol#_bridgeWithPayload() - Any refunded ETH (native token) will be refunded to the DecentBridgeAdapter, making them stuck

Missing access control on UTB:receiveFromBridge allows UTB swaps to be executed without spending bridge fees while bypassing fee/swap instruction signature verification

Unintended or Malicious Use of Prize Winners' Hooks

An attacker can drain ArrakisV2Router from all of its ETH

Chainlink's `latestRoundData` may return stale or incorrect result

MEV bots can win all the auctions when `Auction` is paused

Position NFT can be spammed with insignificant positions by anyone until rewards DoS

Can't pause or remove a minter

Royalty recipients will not get fair share of royalties

Users can fail to unstake and lose their deserved ETH because malfunctioning or untrusted derivative cannot be removed

Underflow of `lpPosition.points` during withdrawLP causes huge reward minting

ReaperVaultERC4626 is not EIP-4626 compliant and integrations can result in loss of funds

Users lose their entire investment when making a deposit and resulting shares are zero

Accrued perfomance fee calculation takes wrong assumptions for share decimals, leading to loss of shares or hyperinflation

Malicious Users Can Drain The Assets Of Vault. (Due to not being ERC4626 Complaint)