Multicall does not work as intended

Incomplete TVL Calculation in `AerodromeConnector::_getPositionTVL` Function.

Numerous errors when calculating the TVL for the MorphoBlue connector

In Dolomite, when opening a borrow position, the holding position in the Registry will never be updated due to the removePosition flag being set to true

Withdrawals in AccountManager are prone to DOS attacks.

The `TVLHelper.sol#getTVL` function is DOSed by the `under collateralized connector`, and as a result, many parts of the protocol may be DOS.

The total deposit amount limit in `AccountingManager.sol` can be bypassed

Missing calls to `_updateTokenInRegistry` leads to incorrect state of tokens in registry

Incorrect modifier condition

Balancer flashloan contract can be DOSed completely by sending 1 wei to it

Camelot and Aerodrome Connector TVL susceptible to manipulation attack

Unauthorized Access to setCurves Function

Arbitralilty Pausing in Auction

Possible Denial of Service (DoS) on Fee-on-Transfer Token

The settle feature will be broken if attacker arbitrarily transfer collateral tokens to the PerpetualAtlanticVaultLP

The peg stability module can be compromised by forcing lowerDepeg to revert.

`UniV3LiquidityAMO::recoverERC721` will cause `ERC721` tokens to be permanently locked in `rdpxV2Core`

Arbitrary low-level call in `DepositStableCoinToDealer` and `GeneralRepay` contracts allows theft of users' approved tokens.

Unable to liquidate USDC blacklisted user's loan due to transferring leftover collateral back in USDC

The commitCollateral() functions can be publicly called causing a permanent lock on user funds and draining approved funds.

Lack of Access Control in the `setCollateralEscrowBeacon()` Function

RubiconMarket batchOffer and batchRequote make offers as self; complete loss of funds for some types of tokens, for example WETH

An attacker can steal all tokens of users that use `FeeWrapper`

Denial-of-Service in the liquidation flow results in the collateral NTF will be stuck in the contract.

`addBlackList()` function can be frontrunned to avoid the remove tokens on them

The deposit fee can be bypassed by using `mintDepositInQueue()` function.

User's profit of the previous epoch will be lost during the rollover process

The function that has `epochHasNotStarted` modifier can be called even if epoch is at the start state.