No slippage protection for Market functions

The price of rsEHT could be manipulated by the first staker

Single host can unfairly skip veto period for proposal that does not have full host support

Attacker can drain all ETH from AuctionDemo when block.timestamp == auctionEndTime

Auction winner can prevent payments via `safeTransferFrom` callback

Chainlink aggregators return the incorrect price if it drops below `minAnswer`

users still forced to follow previously set cooldownDuration even when cooldown is off (set to zero) before unstaking

Malicious users can front-run to cause a denial of service (DoS) for StakedUSDe due to MinShares checks

`create2WithStoredInitCode()` does not revert if contract deployment failed

Unhandled chainlink revert in case its multisigs block access to price feeds

The same signature can be used in different `distribution` implementation causing that the caller who owns the signature, can distribute on unauthorized implementations

Blacklisted STADIUM_ADDRESS address cause fund stuck in the contract forever

Malicious/Compromised organiser can reclaw all funds, stealing work from supporters

If a winner is blacklisted on any of the tokens they can't receive their funds

Lack of checking the existence of the Proxy contract

Centralization Risk for trusted organizers

First depositor can break minting of liquidity shares in GeVault

Sandwich attack to steal all ERC-20 tokens in the Fees contract

Fee on transfer tokens will cause users to lose funds

The `borrow` and `refinance` functions can be front-run by the pool lender to set high interest rates

No expiration deadline leads to losing a lot of funds

staleCheckLatestRoundData() does not check the status of the Arbitrum sequencer in Chainlink feeds.

All of the USD pair price feeds doesn't have 8 decimals

Too many DSC tokens can get minted for fee-on-transfer tokens.

Protocol can break for a token with a proxy and implementation contract (like `TUSD`)

Pragma isn't specified correctly which can lead to nonfunction/damaged contract when deployed on Arbitrum

[H-01] Lack of emergency withdraw function when no arbiter is set

Constructor of `Escrow` should make sure that `buyer`, `seller`, `arbiter` are different from each other.

Add an optional deadline parameter for dispute process

Tokens can be stolen from other users who have approved Magnetar

Potential 99.5% loss in `emergencyWithdraw()` of two Yieldbox strategies

token mights stuck in MagnetarMarketModule contract if the asset doesn't support cross-chain operation

`MagnetarV2#burst` double counts `msg.value` for `TOFT_WRAP` operation, making the transaction revert unless the user overpays

`StargateStrategy#_withdraw`: ether becomes trapped in the contract whenever a user withdraws

`StargateStrategy#_currentBalance` calculation is incorrect and may lead to DoS

all deposit and withdraw function in Convex and Curve nativeLP Strategy, apply slippage on internal pricing; which call real-time on chain price from Curve directly and subject to MEV

Some actions inside MagnetarV2.burst will not work because msg.value is used inside delegate call

Potential loss of value in YieldBox's `depositETHAsset()`

[HB09] `emergencyWithdraw` on all strategy contracts useless without a pause mechanism

It is not possible to execute actions that require ETH (or other protocol token)

Chainlink's `latestRoundData` may return stale or incorrect result

[M-01] Some functions in Talos contracts does not allow user to supply slippage and deadline, which may cause swap revert

RestakeToken function is not permissionless

Lack of slippage protection can lead to significant loss of user funds

Protocol fees can become trapped indefinitely inside Talos vault contracts

Chainlink's `latestRoundData` may return stale or incorrect result

Chainlink aggregators return the incorrect price if it drops below `minAnswer`

Missing check if Chainlink sequencer is down

Missing deadline checks allow pending transactions to be maliciously executed

Incorrect initialization of `ethOracle`

Anyone can arbitrarily inflate the USSD `totalSupply` and cause DoS

Chainlink's latestRoundData return stale or incorrect result

Oracles will return the wrong price for asset if underlying aggregator hits minAnswer

Use of deprecated Chainlink functions

Risk of silent overflow in reserves update

Calling `Position._marketBuy` and `Position._marketSell` functions that calculate `_fee` by dividing by `10000` can cause incorrect calculations

Updating a pool's total points doesn't affect existing stake positions for rewards calculation

Use OpenZeppelin's `SafeERC20` library for ERC20 token transfers

Protocol safeguards for time durations are skewed by a factor of 7. Protocol may potentially lock NFT for period of 7 years.

Manager can get around min reserves check, draining all funds from Collateral.sol

GovNFT: maxBridge has no effect

Centralization risks: owner can freeze withdraws and use timelock to steal all funds

`LPDA` price can underflow the price due to bad settings and potentially brick the contract

ETH will get stuck if all NFTs do not get sold.