When `sellCreditMarket()` is called to sell credit for a specific cash amount, the protocol might receive a lower swapping fee than expected.

Neither `sellCreditMarket‎()` nor `compensate‎()` checks whether the credit position to be sold is allowed for sale

`updateFloatingDebt()` isn't called during `withdrawAtMaturity()`, leading to incorrect accounting of floating interest

Attacker can force a user to enter a market

`_totalSupply` is updated with wrong values when a vesting schedule is revoked

Bridged tokens would be lost if sender and receiver are contracts that don't implement fallback/receive

First block proposer check in the `LibProposing._isProposerPermitted` function is errorneous

Bridge watcher can forge arbitrary message and drain bridge

retryMessage unable to handle edge cases.

The top tier prover can not re-prove

There is no slippage check for the eth deposits processing in the `LibDepositing.processDeposits`

Malicious caller of `processMessage()` can pocket the fee while forcing `excessivelySafeCall()` to fail