In the create() and redeem() functions, the lastFeeClaimTime is not updated, which leads to incorrect fee calculations.

The joinBalancerPool() function does not return the remaining assets to the user.

bid() will result in a denial of service (DoS) attack if the bidder address is on the blacklist.

In the joinBalancerAndPredeposit() function, the remaining Balancer Pool Tokens are not returned to the user.

It is possible to manipulate the price of the BondToken by constructing a dexPool.

There is a logical error inside the ProtectedListings::adjustPosition() function, which could lead to manipulation of users’ interest.

There is a calculation error inside the calculateCompoundedFactor() function, causing users to overpay interest.

The relist() function lacks a check on listing.created, which allows borrowing money from the listing without incurring interest.

Due to the delay in converting token1 fees into token0 (WETH) fees in beforeSwap(), an attacker can execute a sandwich attack to gain risk-free profits.

InfernalRiftBelow.thresholdCross verify the wrong msg.sender

InfernalRiftBelow.claimRoyalties no verification msg.sender

Users with more than 50% of the voting rights can steal other users' tokens.

The shutdown can still be canceled after execute, causing users to fail to claim tokens.

The tokens (collectionTokens and WETH) used for initializeCollection() to create a liquidity position are permanently locked in Uniswap V4.

The fee set by the setFee() function will not take effect.

The unused tokens from the user’s initialization of UniswapV4‘s pool will be locked in the UniswapImplementation contract.

There is a logical error in the removeFeeExemption() function.

There is a calculation error inside the modifyListings() function.

There is a logical error in the _distributeFees() function, resulting in an unfair distribution of fees.

An attacker can block the execution of CollectionShutdown.execute

In the unlockProtectedListing() function, the interest that was supposed to be distributed to LP holders was instead burned.

Malicious users can exploit createListings() and liquidateProtectedListing() functions in the ProtectedListings contract to replace Listings::createListings() in order to evade paying the tax fee.”

The liquidate() function requires that after liquidation, the position must be in a healthy state. This may result in certain positions never being liquidated if they cannot reach a healthy state, potentially leaving them in limbo.

The getValueInEth function should include a price refresh mechanism to prevent outdated prices from causing financial losses for users.

The liquidationFee should be applied to the profit from the liquidation, rather than to all the assets obtained by the liquidator.

Using forceApprove instead of approve

The issue regarding the missing pause functionality has not been resolved.

There is a calculation error in AuraVault::redeem().

AuraVault inherits AccessControl BUT does not call the _setupRole() function in it's constructor to set the initial roles, this leads to a complete DOS of the important claim function rendering the contract unable to claim rewards

`Flashlender.sol#flashLoan()` should use `mintProfit()` to mint fees. The current implemetation may lead to locked up WETH in PoolV3.

Discrepency b/w the `lastRewadTime` and the `lastAllPoolUpdate` can allow for incorrect reward distribution to pools if `registerRewardDeposit` deposits less assets

The debt in EligibilityDataProvider::requiredUsdValue() needs to be converted into USD; otherwise, it is not a correct value comparison.

In `PositionActionPendle::_onDecreaseLever`, `tokenOut` is implemented incorrectly.

Because of the Asset:Share 1:1 Conversion, if Vault Incur a Loss, the Last User to Withdraw Will Take The Entire Loss

In CDPVault::liquidatePositionBadDebt(), the calculation of `loss` is incorrect.

PositionAction.decreaseLever() fails to consider the loan fee in Flashlender when calculating loanAmount, as a result, the functionanlity will not work when protocolFee != 0.

Malicious actor can abuse the minimum shares check in `StakingLPEth` and cause DoS or locked funds for the last user that withdraws

`PositionAction.sol#onCreditFlashLoan` may have leftover tokens after conducting `leverParams.auxSwap`.

In the _splitWithdrawRequest() function, there exists an issue that causes both the from and to requestId to be 0

`EtherFiLib::_initiateWithdrawImpl` will revert because rebase tokens transfer 1-2 less wei

The lack of slippage protection in `EthenaLib::_sellStakedUSDe()` could lead to sandwich attacks.

The _redeemPT function lacks slippage protection.

The withdrawValue calculation in _calculateValueOfWithdrawRequest is incorrect.

After a liquidator liquidates someone else’s position, it could cause a Denial of Service (DoS) when their own position also needs to be liquidated.

The _getValueOfWithdrawRequest function uses different methods for selecting assets in various vaults.

A failed rewardToken transfer results in a loss for the user

Incorrect Comparison Logic in Post-Operation Checks

Logical error in the _executeRedeemStakeToken function in RedeemProcess.sol

Logical error in the getPoolIntValue function in LpPoolQueryProcess.sol

The `executeUpdateLeverageRequest` function is missing the operation to update the borrowing fee

When a user opens a short position, there is a lack of checks on the liquidity pool, which can result in the user being unable to realize their profits if they succeed.

In Cross Margin mode, the user’s profit calculation is incorrect.

Logical error in the processExecutionFee function GasProcess.sol

Using the .call() method to refund the refundFee In processExecutionFee may result in excessive gas consumption and potential reentrancy attacks.

Missing executionFee in the function `createWithdrawRequest`

The check for the user’s collateralUserCap is missing params.amount in AssetsProcess::deposit()

The balance.unsettledAmount is missing in the calculations for `getMaxWithdraw` and `isSubAmountAllowed` in UsdPool.sol

Kerosene collateral is not being moved on liquidation, exposing liquidators to loss

Users can get their Kerosene stuck until TVL becomes greater than Dyad's supply

Flash loan protection mechanism can be bypassed via self-liquidations

Incorrect deployment / missing contract will break functionality