Whitelised accounts can be forcefully DoSed from buying curveTokens during the presale

Unauthorized Access to setCurves Function

Create a short call order with non empty floor makes the option impossible to exercise and withdraw

`fillOrder()` and `exercise()` may lock Ether sent to the contract, forever

SpeedBumpPriceGate: Excess ether did not return to the user

safeTransferFrom is recommended instead of transfer (1)

wrong out of range check

Missing check in the updateValset function

Admin drains all ERC based user funds using withdrawERC20()

`call()` should be used instead of `transfer()` on an `address payable`

StakedCitadel depositors can be attacked by the first depositor with depressing of vault token denomination

StakedCitadel doesn't use correct balance for internal accounting

Funding.deposit() doesn't work if there is no discount set

Can force borrower to pay huge interest

Add a timelock to PaladinRewardReserve functions

ERC20 bridging functions do not revert on non-zero msg.value

Reputation Risks with `contractOwner`

COLLATERAL_MINTER_ROLE can be granted by the deployer of QuantConfig and mint arbitrary amount of tokens

DoS by gas limit

Improper Upper Bound Definition on the Fee

Owners have absolute control over protocol

denial fo service

InsuranceFund depositors can be priced out & deposits can be stolen

liquidation is vulnerable to sandwich attacks

Wrong slippage check

fees can be any amount

[WP-H0] `DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE` of `BribeVault` can steal tokens from users' wallets

It's possible to follow deleted profiles

missing whenNotPaused

[WP-H14] `ConvexStakingWrapper`, `StakingRewards` Wrong implementation will send `concur` rewards to the wrong receiver

Repeated Calls to Shelter.withdraw Can Drain All Funds in Shelter

[WP-H2] `ConvexStakingWrapper#deposit()` depositors may lose their funds when the `_amount` is huge

wrong minting amount

Double transfer in the `transferAndCall` function of `ERC677`

[WP-H1] The value of LP token can be manipulated by the first minister, which allows the attacker to dilute future liquidity providers' shares

the first depositor to a pool can drain all users

[WP-H39] `PoolTemplate.sol#resume()` Wrong implementation of `resume()` will compensate overmuch redeem amount from index pools

Unbounded iteration over all indexes (2)

deposit() function is open to reentrancy attacks

Vaults with non-UST underlying asset vulnerable to flash loan attack on curve pool

`investedAssets()` Does Not Take Into Consideration The Performance Fee Charged On Strategy Withdrawals

unsponsor, claimYield and withdraw might fail unexpectadly

Changing a strategy can be bricked

users might pay enormous amouts of gas

`VaderPoolV2` minting synths & fungibles can be frontrun

Oracle doesn't calculate USDV/VADER price correctly

denial of service

theft of system profit