In removeValueSingle() tax is always 0 due to incorrect variable used

Tax is applied twice in the removeValueSingle()

Mismatch in vesting position ticks in collectFees() may lead to DoS

Token amounts mismatch in repayFromWithdraw calculation in Leverager.sol:withdraw() function

Infinite loop in openLeveragedPosition() when swap path has multiple pools

LeverageManager may not return remaining borrow amount to user in removeLeverage()

Underflow when updating credit delegation will result protocol DoS

Unclaimed Rewards Loss Due to Missing Validation in `VaultRouterBranch.stake()`

Incorrect vault debt validation logic in rebalanceVaultsAssets causes reverts

Staking design is not fair for users who staked earlier and longer

No way to set UsdTokenSwapConfig pd curve parameters

Invalid Calls and Reverts Due to Trailing Zeros in FeeConversionKeeper’s Upkeep Data

FullFill Swap will Fail due to minAmountOut wrong calculation

Whitelisted users can create trading accounts for non-whitelisted users

CurveAdapter uses non-existent exchange_with_best_rate() method, breaking fee conversion on Arbitrum.

Tokens may stuck in BalancerRouter contract because of incorrect assumption about balancerVault.joinPool behavior

endAuction() will always revert in successful Auction because current period auctionAddress always equals address(0)

Attacker can manipulate totalSellReserveAmount to prevent successfull auction

Critical: Malicious user can delete all Users Deposited Liquidity.

quantAMMSwapFeeTake used for both getQuantAMMSwapFeeTake and getQuantAMMUpliftFeeTake.

Redeeming ETH yields is impossible: usdaGainedFromLiquidation always equals 0

User can redeem any USDT amount they want by manipulating usdtPrice