`_handleLiquidationSuccess()` will always revert

User can borrow amount which is greater than 0 such as literally one wei of a token, which will be not profitable to liquidate

`liquidateBorrowAllowedInternal()` has a flaw in which it takes the mantissa close factor from the borrowed amount without the interest

`approveRedeemRequest()` takes the fee out of the redeemed yUSD, thus the user will not receive less collateral due to this

In `rewardPerToken()` a big rounding loss vector is uncovered

Dilution of rewards given that an attacker sends 1 wei every block

We would not be able to restake the LP tokens (symmio/usdc) if their total is less than the unlocked amount

`_getPoolFee()` gives you a zero fee for Arbitrum and passes it as a Uni V3 fee, giving it the impossibility of making the dex_adapter do the swap

synth scaling variable is subject to rounding twice when <`cf_critical`

Order is not deleted from the mapping

Creation of order ids is flawed

updateDownsideProtected() has no access control mechanism

`calculateCumulativeRate()` is called in liquidate, but updating `lastEventTime` is nowhere to be seen

Interest rate accrued from liquidation of debt can't be withdrawn

Repaying the loan and withdrawing collateral doesn't check the validity of the option

`withdrawUserWhoNotOptedForLiq()` retains part of the accrued usdA reward, but it can't be claimed

Resetting `lastEventTime` before calling `calculateCumulativeRate()` is problematic

Not updating `lastEthprice` in `borrowing::depositTokens()` leads to a stale eth price

`executeSetterFunction()` lacks any type of access control

Malicious actor can DoS the whole lending functionality resulting in all lending offers being stucked

`changePerpetual()` may underflow `activeOrdersCount`

Compromised addresses should be prevented from interacting with any functions that are available to addresses that have no compromised flag on them.

Re-registering an account doesn't reset it

_getReserveRatioScalar() will give a lesser value than expected

Tokens are stuck when CollectionShutdown.sol#cancel() is invoked

User can pay almost no interest if he first pays most of the debt through ProtectedListings.sol#adjustPosition()

Unrestricted Changes to Token Settings Allow Artists to Alter Critical Features

Exposed `_removeCredIdPerAddress` & `_addCredIdPerAddress` allows anyone to cause issues to current holders as well as upcoming ones

Attacker can DOS user from selling shares of a credId

`mintToken()`, `mintWithBudget()`, and `forge()` in the `TraitForgeNft` Contract Will Fail Due to a Wrong Modifier Used in `EntropyGenerator.initializeAlphaIndices()`

The maximum number of generations is infinite

Number of entities in generation can surpass the 10k number

Wrong minting logic based on total token count across generations

Forger Entities can forge more times than intended

NFTs mature too slowly under default settings.