Backrunning `claimFees()` unfairly gives better rates

[H-01] Auction tokens will be lost forever when auction ends without bids

Native token withdrawal fails until manually approved

Unnecessary balance checks and precision issues in TokenManager::_transfer

[Low-01] Missing Access Control in `CapitalPool::approve()` Function Allows any User to call it to set Allowance Amount `TokenContract` to `type(uint256).max`.

Pause and unpause functions are inaccessible

`Keepers` does not implement EIP712 correctly on multiple occasions

Using the same heartbeat for multiple price feeds

Dust donation might DOS all connectors to create new holding positions, by preventing removing existing holding positions

`PanopticFactory` uses spot price when deploying new pools, resulting in liquidity manipulation when minting

Freezed Chain will never be unfreeze since `StateTransitionManager::unfreezeChain` is calling `freezeDiamond` instead of `unfreezeDiamond`.

User can erase their position debt for free

Borrowers can DoS liquidations by repaying as little as 1 share.

Chainlink price feed uses BTC, not WBTC. In case of depegging, oracles will become easier to manipulate.

Adversary can prevent updating price feed addresses by creating poisonous proposals ending in `_confirm`

Looping over unbounded `pendingStakes` array can lead to permanent DoS and frozen funds

Malicious delegatees can block delegators from redelegating and from sending their NFTs

No check for sequencer uptime can lead to dutch auctions failing or executing at bad prices