Anyone can mint tokens by re-using their proof

_getOraclePrice() doesn't check If Arbitrum sequencer is down in Chainlink feeds

DOS protocol by continuely triggering the `is_accepting_new_orders` false state by passing a low `min_amount_out`

Incorrect calculation of the slippage when reducing positions .

Hardcoded threshold does not hold true for several trending and widely used tokens

Debt is not updated when removing margin from a position

Wrong calculation of `tickCumulatives` due to hardcoded pool fees

Usage of `slot0` is extremely easy to manipulate

If any stable depegs, oracle will fail, disabling swaps

No clear threshold on when the oracle is updated will cause stale prices to be accepted

No slippage or deadline control for swapping while stability burning

Creating an order of type MarketIncrease opens an attack vector where attacker can execute txs with stale prices by inputting a very extense swapPath

Unpaid funding fees from wrong calculation are going to be substracted from the pool

Wrong if statement logic breaks the claimable process

Dividing before multiplication will lead to less fees being paid