transfer method prevents the use of USDT token on GatewaySend contract

An attacker can use cross chain borrowing to drain another chain

Cross chain borrow functionality negelects remote chain debts

`_handleValidBorrowRequest` does not scale the previous borrow amount using the current index

Borrow function misapplies single market borrow factor to multi market borrowed value

Baddebts will continue to accrue for some underwater positions

USDT tokens will be permanently stuck and unredeemable

An attacker can redeem all the usdt tokens available in the protocol for a small amount of usda

A malicious user can reuse a previously signed `excessProfitCumulativeValue` to steal profit.

`Abond_Token.sol::transferfrom` does not correctly update state

Logic flaw in `BorrowLib.sol::getOptionFeesTOPay` allows users to bypass the `renewOption` deadline

An Attacker can update `downsideProtected`

A malicious borrower can make their position immune to `Liquidationtype1`

Profit/Loss will be wrongly updated between concecutive deposits

An attacker can disrupt multisgn quorum on setter functions.

`Ethvolatility` is never verified and can be abused by users

Excess native token sent in `borrowing.sol::renewOptions` is not refunded and can be stolen by other users

An attacker can delete all lending order leading to a permanent loss of funds and other adverse effects

Asset reallocation failure due to incorrect handling of zero allocation

Incorrect stale time check resulting in periods of inactivity

Ineffective implementation of the pause mechanism in the Superpool

Delisted assets still stands as a collateral