The calculation of `totalAssets()` could be wrong if `operatorFeeAmount` > 0, this can cause potential loss for the new depositors

Incorrect Logic in onlyOperator Modifier Leading to Denial-of-Service for Authorized Operators Across Critical Functions

Incorrect event emission can be done as a griefing attack

Inability to update `oracleStalenessThreshold` can lead to incorrect weight calculations

Users can claim more that their actual allotment

Incorrect referral fee calculations

Accounting error in `Abond_Token::transferFrom` leads to broken functionality and loss of funds

Lack of input validation in `borrowing::redeemYields` allows anyone to redeem abond tokens as per someone else's `ethBacked` abond state

Re-usable signatures can lead to loss of funds.

Lack of expiry in signatures can lead to hoarding signatures for a profitable `CDS:withdraw` in future

Users can renew options at any time

Malicious actor can DoS admin functions due to lack of access control

Stale `lastEthprice` used in `borrowing::depositTokens` will artificially inflate/deflate the ratio

Protected downside is not updated when `cds.getTotalCdsDepositedAmount() < downsideProtected`

Users can game the voucher pool fees denying other vouchers from their rightful fees.

Incorrect `marketFunds` accounting will lead to loss of funds

Attacker can deny lend order cancellation for others leading to loss of funds.

Improper handling of token order in `MixOracle.sol` will lead to bricked/incorrect price feed.

Malicious actor can match his own lend and borrow order using a flash loan to inflate incentives at end of epoch.

Subtraction in `variance()` will revert due to underflow

Request responses and validations can be mocked leading to extraction of fees and/or forcing other generators to lose their fees by making them outliers

Unrestricted validation score range for validators in `LLMOracleCoordinator::validate`.

Users can list assets with price < 1 ERC20 (ETH, WETH), leading to potential DoS vulnerability.

Incorrect Proof-of-Work Difficulty Check in `assertValidNonce` Function

Griefer can permanently DOS all the deposits to the `StakingPool`

H-1: Raffle termination due to insufficient checks in `WinnablesTicketManager::_checkShouldCancel`

M-1: `setCCIPCounterpart()` allows admin to deny raffle winner from claiming prize.

Malicious user can stake an amount which causes zero curStakeAtRisk on a loss but equal rewardPoints to a fair user on a win