When borrowers repay USDS, it is sent to the wrong address, allowing anyone to burn Protocol Owned Liquidity and build bad debt for USDS

User can evade `liquidation` by depositing the minimum of tokens and gain time to not be liquidated

First depositor can break staking-rewards accounting

First Liquidity provider can claim all initial pool rewards

Attacker Can Inflate LP Position Value To Create a Bad Debt Loan

Chainlink price feed uses BTC, not WBTC. In case of depegging, oracles will become easier to manipulate.

SALT staker can get extra voting power by simply unstaking their xSALT

Unwhitelisting does not clear _arbitrageProfits, so re-whitelisting may result in an unfair distribution of liquidity rewards.

Absence of autonomous mechanism for `selling collateral assets in the external market in exchange for USDS` will cause undercollateralization during market crashes and will cause USDS to depeg.

If there is only one USDS borrower, he can never be liquidated

A user can steal an already transfered and bridged reSDL lock because of approval

Attacker can exploit lock update logic on secondary chains to increase the amount of rewards sent to a specific secondary chain

Attacker can drain all ETH from AuctionDemo when block.timestamp == auctionEndTime

Attacker can reenter to mint all the collection supply

Adversary can block `claimAuction()` due to push-strategy to transfer assets to multiple bidders

Borrower has no way to update `maxTotalSupply` of `market` or close market.

Function WildcatMarketController.setAnnualInterestBips allows for values outside the factory range

When a batch of withdrawals expires, that batch is often underpaid their owed interest

Whitelisted allocators in QVSimpleStrategy can vote an infinite number of times (~inf voice credits), breaking the voting system

When `useRegistryAnchor` is true, RFPSimpleStrategy is bricked and all calls to `_registerRecipient` will revert

Voice credits cast are incorrectly updated for recipients, allowing allocators to game voting to increase votes for their chosen recipient

Users Lose Funds and Market Functionality Breaks When Market Reachs 65k Id

LibOracle fails to check the fidelity of price data from WETH/USDC pool, which can lead to price manipulation

The settle feature will be broken if attacker arbitrarily transfer collateral tokens to the PerpetualAtlanticVaultLP

Improper precision of strike price calculation can result in broken protocol

The peg stability module can be compromised by forcing lowerDepeg to revert.

Users can get immediate profit when deposit and redeem in `PerpetualAtlanticVaultLP`

_curveSwap: getDpxEthPrice and getEthPrice is in wrong order

reLP() mintokenAAmount the calculations are wrong.

Bonding WETH discounts can drain WETH reserves of RdpxV2Core contract to zero

Can not withdraw RDPX if WETH withdrawn is zero

The same signature can be used in different `distribution` implementation causing that the caller who owns the signature, can distribute on unauthorized implementations

Owner can incorrectly pull funds from contests not yet expired

Sandwich attack to steal all ERC-20 tokens in the Fees contract

During refinance() new Pool balance debt is subtracted twice

[H-04] Lender#buyLoan - Malicious user could take over a loan for free without having a pool because of wrong access control

Fee on transfer tokens will cause users to lose funds

Forcing a borrower to pay a huge debt via the giveLoan()

WETH staking rewards accumulated before the first staker deposits remain unutilized and stuck in the `Staking` contract

The `borrow` and `refinance` functions can be front-run by the pool lender to set high interest rates

Fixed fee level is used when swap tokens on Uniswap

Theft of collateral tokens with fewer than 18 decimals

Too many DSC tokens can get minted for fee-on-transfer tokens.

Fee-on-transfer tokens aren't supported

[H-01] Lack of emergency withdraw function when no arbiter is set

Add methods to add/update arbiter in existing Escrow contracts

Gas fees are refunded to a wrong address when transferring tokens via `InterchainToken.interchainTransferFrom`

Proposal requiring native coin transfers cannot be executed

Users can circumvent blacklist to continue to receive and send tokens

Incorrect function call in LybraRETHVault's getAssetPrice

Understatement of `poolTotalPeUSDCirculation` amounts due to incorrect accounting after function `_repay` is called

Incorrect Reward Distribution Calculation in `ProtocolRewardsPool`

`stakerewardV2pool.withdraw()` should check the user's boost lock status.

The EUSDMiningIncentives contract is incorrectly implemented and can allow for more than the intended amount of rewards to be minted

Attacker can bypass fee accounting and effectively steal all fees from any Multipool contract

In `LlamaRelativeQuorum`, the governance result might be incorrect as it counts the wrong approval/disapproval.

It is not possible to execute actions that require ETH (or other protocol token)

LlamaPolicy could be DOS by creating large amount of actions.

Fetching asset prices from oracle does not check for stale prices, which can lead to invalid prices for assets

Lack of checking for stale price data from chainlink oracles can potentially lead to incorrect prices

Improper oracle integration due to lack of accounting for sequencer downtime for L2 chains

Potential loss of funds when transferring tokens from L2 to L1 due to two-step `inflationMultiplier` update

Lack of access control on `mintRebalancer` function can lead to bricking core protocol functionality

Lack of any slippage protection can result in all swaps getting sandwiched

Multiple incorrect oracle configurations will lead to drastically incorrect prices for collateral

Denial of service for the `SellUSSDBuyCollateral` function when the collateral value for DAI is less than its specified flutter ratio

The equation for calculating `amountToSellUnits` in the `BuyUSSDSellCollateral` function is incorrect and breaks entire functionality

Lack of checking for stale price data from chainlink oracles can potentially lead to incorrect results and excessive arbitrage opportunities

Denial of service for `BuyUSSDSellCollateral` when the collateral value for DAI is less than `amountToBuyLeftUSD`

Excessive approvals in FootiumEscrow allows attacker to steal all players from club after transferring the club to another user

Wrong calculation of repayment amount in Position contract

Reward accounting is incorrect in BathBuddy contract

Calling `Position._marketBuy` and `Position._marketSell` functions that calculate `_fee` by dividing by `10000` can cause incorrect calculations

Staking, unstaking and rebalanceToWeight can be sandwiched (Mainly rETH deposit )

Any user can trivially circumvent deposit fee to deposit free of charge at any point in time before an epoch begins

All users in the rollover queue can be griefed/forced to lose their earnings

Attacker can actively perform denial of service, by selectively preventing depositors from entering rollover queue

Attacker can cause permanent denial of service, blocking all rollovers indefinitely

Attacker can drain all funds from a vault if a depegging event happens prior to any epoch starting

Underflow of `lpPosition.points` during withdrawLP causes huge reward minting