An attacker can create arbitrary orders for other users

An attacker can modify the orders of other users.

The precision loss within the adjustForDecimals() function will result in a reduced minAmountReceived for the user.

An attacker can perform a reentrancy attack in OracleLess::fillOrder() to steal tokens from the contract.

OracleLess.pendingOrderIds array Dos attack.

The logic for checking stale prices in PythOracle::currentValue() is implemented incorrectly (reversed).

Resolver is not initialized in the protocol's keeper

Reentrancy check in account_contract can be easily circumvented

AuraVault inherits AccessControl BUT does not call the _setupRole() function in it's constructor to set the initial roles, this leads to a complete DOS of the important claim function rendering the contract unable to claim rewards

Malicious actor can abuse the minimum shares check in `StakingLPEth` and cause DoS or locked funds for the last user that withdraws

An attacker can DoS a coinswap pool

Early user can break pool via inflation attack due to no minimum liquidity check in the incentive contract

Incentive accumulation can be sandwiched with additional shares to gain advantage over long-term depositors

Any fee claim lesser than the total `yieldFeeBalance` as unit of shares is lost and locked in the `PrizeVault` contract

An attacker can crash the cluster system by sending an HTTP request with a huge timeout

A cache that times out can be recovered.

[M09] No slippage check in `remove_liquidity` function in omnipool can lead to slippage losses during liquidity withdrawal.

User can evade `liquidation` by depositing the minimum of tokens and gain time to not be liquidated

First depositor can break staking-rewards accounting

First Liquidity provider can claim all initial pool rewards

DOS of proposals by abusing ballot names without important parameters

SALT staker can get extra voting power by simply unstaking their xSALT

Reusing a SALT that has already been used for voting can allow a malicious proposal to pass and compromise the protocol.

Creation of token whitelisting proposals can be DOS'd

Attack to make ````CurveSubject```` to be a ````HoneyPot````

Unrestricted claiming of fees due to missing balance updates in `FeeSplitter`

Unauthorized Access to setCurves Function

A subject creator within a single block can claim holder fees without holding due to unprotected reentrancy path

onBalanceChange causes previously unclaimed rewards to be cleared

Theft of holder fees when `holderFeePercent` was positive and is set to zero

ERC20TokenEmitter will not work after a certain period of time

Since buyToken function has no slippage checking, users can get less tokens than expected when they buy tokens directly

The quorumVotes can be bypassed

Malicious borrower can decrease Guild holders reward

Broken `NonceVoter` Allows Observer to Halt the Chain

Possible index out of range in GetVoterIndex could cause ballot to never finalize due to panic

An already executed InTxTracker can still be added

Arbitrary destination gas limit for `CoinType_Zeta` cctxs results in paying lower gas fees

Funds from reverted transaction may be lost/locked

User not refunded for failed Zeta gas payment in cross chain transaction

Limited Voting Options Allow Ballot Creation Spam

No slippage protection for Market functions

The price of rsEHT could be manipulated by the first staker

Protocol mints less rsETH on deposit than intended

Update in strategy will cause wrong issuance of shares

Attacker can drain all ETH from AuctionDemo when block.timestamp == auctionEndTime

On a Linear or Exponential Descending Sale Model, a user that mint on the last `block.timestamp` mint at an unexpected price.

Delegated votes are locked when owner lock is expired

The sending failure of _lzSend is not considered