Availability of deposit invariant can be bypassed

The `TitlesGraph` contract is vulnerable to front-run attack

Attacker can make 0 value deposit() calls to deny user from redeeming or withdrawing collateral

Design flaw and mismanagement in vault licensing leads to double counting in collateral ratios and positions collateralized entirely with kerosine

Users can get their Kerosene stuck until TVL becomes greater than Dyad's supply

Anyone could call `depositReward` with zero reward to extend the period finish time

The `nextYieldDistribution` can be manipulated, compromising the functionality of `forwardYield`, which distributes yield every 30 days

The `BURNER` cannot burn tokens from accounts not KYC verified due to the check in `_beforeTokenTransfer`.

The highest bidder could cancel bid via `cancelAllBidsAndWithdrawCollateral` function

The incorrect calculation of tax in the `TokenSale` contract may result in users paying excessive taxes

The `_zapIn` function may unexpectedly revert due to the incorrect implementation of `_transferTokenInAndApprove`

Any fee claim lesser than the total `yieldFeeBalance` as unit of shares is lost and locked in the `PrizeVault` contract

Accounts that have been blacklisted still retain the ability to engage with stablecoins

Holders array can be manipulated by transferring or burning with amount 0, stealing rewards or bricking certain functions

Withdrawal from NFTs can be temporarily blocked

Distribution can be bricked, and double claims by a few holders are possible when owner calls `LiquidInfrastructureERC20::setDistributableERC20s`

Malicious user can stake an amount which causes zero curStakeAtRisk on a loss but equal rewardPoints to a fair user on a win

A locked fighter can be transferred; leads to game server unable to commit transactions, and unstoppable fighters

Player can mint more fighter NFTs during claim of rewards by leveraging reentrancy on the `claimRewards() function `

Fighters cannot be minted after the initial generation due to uninitialized `numElements` mapping

Non-transferable `GameItems` can be transferred with `GameItems::safeBatchTransferFrom(...)`

DoS in `MergingPool::claimRewards` function and potential DoS in `RankedBattle::claimNRN` function if called after a significant amount of rounds passed.

The `editPool()` lacks a sanity check on the `payoutStart` parameter leading to incorrect or unfair reward distributions

Users are unable to withdraw immediately, even if they stake after reaching maxEndTime

Anyone can update the address of the Router in the DcntEth contract to any address they would like to set.

Users could deposit 0 ETH into the round

User can evade `liquidation` by depositing the minimum of tokens and gain time to not be liquidated

formPOL lacks slippage and deadline protection

The owner of the last NFT is ineligible to claim his TELCOIN if other NFTs have been burned

Unrestricted claiming of fees due to missing balance updates in `FeeSplitter`

Unauthorized Access to setCurves Function

Selling will be bricked if all other tokens are withdrawn to ERC20 token

onBalanceChange causes previously unclaimed rewards to be cleared

If a user sets their curve token symbol as the default one plus the next token counter instance it will render the whole default naming functionality obsolete

Users will lose all their rewards in the `VirtualStakingRewards` after migration

Users could mint and redeem Ubiquity Dollar with a more favorable Dollar price

Incorrect implementation of `_getNextTokenId` causing the loss of the founder's token

Users will lose rewards when buying new tokens if they already own some tokens

The price of rsEHT could be manipulated by the first staker

Attacker can drain all ETH from AuctionDemo when block.timestamp == auctionEndTime

Multiple mints can brick any form of `salesOption` 3 mintings

On a Linear or Exponential Descending Sale Model, a user that mint on the last `block.timestamp` mint at an unexpected price.

Auction payout goes to AuctionDemo contract owner, not the token owner

Agents with Healing Opportunity Will Be Terminated Directly if The `escape` Reduces activeAgents to the Number of `NUMBER_OF_SECONDARY_PRIZE_POOL_WINNERS` or Fewer

Soft Restricted Staker Role can withdraw stUSDe for USDe

Incorrect calculations for Surplus Auction creation cause massive surplus imbalances

The `BURNER` cannot burn tokens from accounts not KYC verified due to the check in `_beforeTokenTransfer`.

Underflow in updateTranscoderWithFees can cause corrupted data and loss of winning tickets.

The settle feature will be broken if attacker arbitrarily transfer collateral tokens to the PerpetualAtlanticVaultLP

The peg stability module can be compromised by forcing lowerDepeg to revert.

V3Proxy swapTokensForExactETH does not send back to the caller the unused input tokens

An attacker can manipulate the preDepositvePrice to steal from other users.

Underflow of `lpPosition.points` during withdrawLP causes huge reward minting

Staking rewards can be drained