`rewardPerToken` can round down 0, losing rewards for users

Satellite chains can't execute `onlyGovernance` functions

PortfolioToken::deposit is vulnerable to reverse LP sandwich attacks

First depositor can inflate the real amounts

Users can steal funds meant for refunds through `_doMixSwap`

Users can steal funds meant for refunds using a `decoded.targetZRC20`

Anyone can steal a refund from Solana

Zeta Chain contracts doesn't check source sender, which results in compromised instructions

`GatewayTransferNative::onCall` don't decrease `amount` when platform fee is deducted

Revert transaction from BTC will refund funds to a random address

`AccountEncoder::decompressAccounts` does not decode `isWritable` correctly

GatewayTransferNative::withdraw - The function is public and can be called by anyone

`_existsPairPool` has flawed design, which allows for an attacker to control

`_swapAndSendERC20Tokens` has no slippage protection

borrowing::liquidate - `lastEventTime` isn't updated after `calculateCumulativeRate` is called

`GlobalVariables` may be compromised, if there are concurrent in-flight messages

borrowing::depositTokens - `calculateCumulativeRate` is called after borrower has been added

borrowing::_withdraw - `lastEventTime` is updated before calling `calculateCumulativeRate`

Attackers can force the rewards to be stuck in the contract with malicious `x/tokenfactory` denoms

Logical error in `validate_fees_are_paid` can cause a DoS or allow users to bypass fees if `denom_creation_fee` includes multiple coins including `pool_creation_fee` and the user attempts to pay all fees using only `pool_creation_fee`

When a user single-side deposit into a pool, slippage protection is invalid

`withdraw_liquidity` lacks slippage protection

Single sided liquidity can't be used to lock LP tokens in the farm manager

Penalty fees can be shared among future farms or expired farms, risks of exploits

Unspent gas fees are always refunded to the `FeePayer()` which leads to incorrect refunds if the `FeeGranter()` paid for the fees

Potentially sensitive issue - disclosed privately

`xfeemarket` module is not wired up, resulting in non-working CLI commands, message server, genesis export

Positions, which are using assets with large heartbeat may accrue bad debt

Exploiter can always bypass `LIQUIDATION_DISCOUNT` and always seize all collateral

Exploiter can force user into unhealthy condition and liquidate him

SuperPoolFactory

Under certain circumstances bad debt will cause first depositor to lose funds

Pool::liquidate()

`SuperPool` has a `togglePause` function, but lack `whenNotPaused` modifier

Liquidators won't have incentive to repay positions under some conditions

`SuperPool#convertToShares` violates ERC4626

Use can grief `SuperPool#reallocate` for USDT because it doesn't use `forceApprove`

`WellUpgradeable` can be upgraded by anyone

Stable2LUT1::getRatiosFromPriceLiquidity - In extreme cases, `updateReserve` will start breaking

For extreme ratios getRatiosFromPriceSwap will return data for which is impossible to converge into a reserve

Malicious users can front-run host users safe management actions and add those safes as root for wrong org

Safe owner/s can prevent being removed from organization by indefinitely increasing their child array

Many cases `stEth::transferFrom` will transfer 1-2 less way, which would result in revert in consequent functions, because of not enough balance

Loss of funds when deposit flow uses `_ethTOeEth`, because deposit amount is not handled correctly

SophonFarming.sol

Malicious actor can use block stuffing to force staker into another cycle

Insufficient input validation on `SablierV2NFTDescriptor::safeAssetSymbol` allows an attacker to obtain stored XSS

The overflow in the `_calculateStreamedAmount` function can lead to unexpected results.

`SablierV2Lockup.sol` - The caller of withdraw and renounce can skip callbacks, by sending less gas

Use of CREATE method is suspicious of reorg attack

`LenderCommitmentGroup_Smart.sol::burnSharesToWithdrawEarnings` steal previous depositors funds

TellerV2.sol

LenderCommitmentGroup_Smart.sol#liquidateDefaultedLoanWithIncentive()

LenderCommitmentGroup_Smart.sol

LenderCommitmentGroup_Smart.sol

LenderCommitmentGroup_Smart.sol#getCollateralRequiredForPrincipalAmount()

If `repayLoanCallback` address doesn't implement `repayLoanCallback` try/catch won't go into the catch and will revert the tx

Unchecked `transferFrom` value may lead to borrower falsy repaying loan

`LendderCommitmentGroup::_calculateCollateralTokensAmountEq` may be manipulated

LenderCommitmentGroup_Smart.sol#liquidateDefaultedLoanWithIncentive()

User can easily DoS `FlashRolloverLoan_G5` for USDT loans

__Ownable_init is missing in LenderCommitmentGroup_Smart and TellerV2

TellerV2.sol#lenderAcceptBid()

`FlashRolloverLoan_G5::_acceptCommitment` with `smartCommitmentAddress` uses wrong signature

LenderCommitmentGroup_Smart.sol#_generateTokenNameAndSymbol()

LenderCommitmentGroup_Smart.sol#__valueOfUnderlying()

Inability to perform partial liquidations allows huge positions to accrue bad debt in the system

Design flaw and mismanagement in vault licensing leads to double counting in collateral ratios and positions collateralized entirely with kerosine

Users can get their Kerosene stuck until TVL becomes greater than Dyad's supply

User can get their Kerosene stuck because of an invalid check on withdraw

Unable to withdraw Kerosene from `vaultmanagerv2::withdraw` as it expects a `vault.oracle()` method which is missing in Kerosene vaults

`VaultManagerV2.sol::burnDyad` function is missing an `isDNftOwner` modifier, allowing a user to burn another user's minted DYAD

Attacker can frontrun to prevent vaults from being removed from the dNFT owner's position

No incentive to liquidate small positions could result in protocol going underwater

Value of kerosene can be manipulated to force liquidate users

Incorrect deployment / missing contract will break functionality

JalaRouter02.sol

JalaPair.sol#_update()

LMPStrategy.sol#getRebalanceVaueStats() - Assumes that LMPVault token decimals are 18, which leads to incorrect accounting

RioLRTWithdrawalQueue.sol#settleEpochFromEigenLayer()

Asset.sol#transferETH()

AbstractStakingAM.sol#_getRewardBalances()

When `DecentBridgeExecutor.execute` fails, funds will be sent to a random address

Users will lose their cross-chain transaction if the destination router do not have enough WETH reserves.

Anyone can update the address of the Router in the DcntEth contract to any address they would like to set.

DecentEthRouter.sol#_bridgeWithPayload() - Any refunded ETH (native token) will be refunded to the DecentBridgeAdapter, making them stuck

The quorumVotes can be bypassed

CultureIndex.sol#dropTopVotedPiece() - Malicious user can manipulate topVotedPiece to DoS the whole CultureIndex and AuctionHouse

Bidder can use donations to get VerbsToken from auction that already ended.

It may be possible to DoS AuctionHouse by specifying malicious creators

Re-triggering the `canOffboard[term]` flag to bypass the DAO vote of the lending term offboarding mechanism

The price of rsEHT could be manipulated by the first staker

Possible arbitrage from Chainlink price discrepancy

Update in strategy will cause wrong issuance of shares

Borrower has no way to update `maxTotalSupply` of `market` or close market.

Borrower can drain all funds of a sanctioned lender

Function WildcatMarketController.setAnnualInterestBips allows for values outside the factory range

`collectFees()` updates delinquency wrongly as `_writeState()` is called before assets are transferred

Prime.sol - User can claim Prime token without having any staked XVS, because his `stakedAt` isn't reset whenever he is issued an irrevocable token.

```trancheTokenAmount``` should be rounded UP when proceeding to a withdrawal or previewing a withdrawal.

Clearinghouse.sol#claimDefaulted()

Cooler.sol#provideNewTermsForRoll()

Malicious/Compromised organiser can reclaw all funds, stealing work from supporters

Centralization Risk for trusted organizers

Sandwich attack to steal all ERC-20 tokens in the Fees contract

During refinance() new Pool balance debt is subtracted twice

[H-04] Lender#buyLoan - Malicious user could take over a loan for free without having a pool because of wrong access control

Using forged/fake lending pools to steal any loan opening for auction

The `borrow` and `refinance` functions can be front-run by the pool lender to set high interest rates

Single-step process for critical ownership transfer is risky

Lender contract can be drained by re-entrancy in `seizeLoan`

Rounding error leads to borrowing loans without paying interest

Chainlink oracle will return the wrong price if the aggregator hits `minAnswer`

Fee-on-transfer tokens aren't supported

`tokenContract`is always an unsafe input, for fairness, it is recommended to add a whitelist for token