Fee is not paid by user when redeeming, issue leads to decreased collaterilization ratio

Rejected and withdraw request are not removed from currentPeriodTotalAmount

Users can not convert SYMM to LP

Rewards can be pushed forward by dusting notifyRewardAmount

Potentially sensitive issue - disclosed privately

1.Potentially sensitive issue - disclosed privately

Removal of pool from reward zone does not allow gulping emissions which were already distributed in the past

Debt position interest is compounded while pool interest is simple causing inconsistency b/w `expectedLiquidity_` and `availableLiquidity_`

`PoolV3#repayCreditAccount()` use incorrect share converting function to calculate profit and loss

Taiko L1 - Proposer can maliciously cause loss of funds by forcing someone else to pay prover's fee

Validity and contests bond ca be incorrectly burned for the correct and ultimately verified transition

Gas issuance is inflated and will halt the chain or lead to incorrect base fee

First block proposer check in the `LibProposing._isProposerPermitted` function is errorneous

Bridge watcher can forge arbitrary message and drain bridge

A recalled ERC20 bridge transfer can lock tokens in the bridge

Epoch is not incremented when withdrawing from EigenLayer

Users can circumvent slashing penalties by front-running EigenLayer updates

Slashing penalty is unfairly paid by a subset of users if a deficit is accumulated.

Incorrect calculation of available shares lead to locked funds

ETH withdrawers do not earn yield while waiting for a withdrawal

Permanent loss of tokens if swap data gets outdated

Attacker can steal all fees from SFPM in pools with ERC777 tokens.

Wrong LTV and threshold LTV when in E-Mode

Delevering can be blocked by other positions

Operator is blocked when sequencer is down on Arbitrum

Oracle Price miss matched when E-mode uses single oracle

Ripcord can be pulled when the sequencer is down

Blacklisted user can front-run liquidation and block liquidation of unsafe position

Liquidator can steal collateral by buying NFTs from a liquidated user

Unauthorized users can accept loans due to faulty update of commitmentBorrowerList

Market owner can change fees to 100% and collect the majority of the principal

Transfer-on-fee/deflationary tokens can lock collateral and cause a borrower to default.

An attacker can manipulate the preDepositvePrice to steal from other users.

`WstEth` derivative assumes a ~1=1 peg of stETH to ETH

Protection buyers can exploit renewal functionality to enable and disable protection and as a result pay much less premium

Protection buyers can receive protection during their final payment period without paying for it

Anybody can front-run accruePremium..() and receive rewards as if they had provided protection since last accrual

withdrawlRequests and totalSTokenRequested are not updated when sTokens are transferred

Buyers of protection can be protected in the first 90 days without paying a premium