AdvancedDistributorInitializable sets claim data to empty, making claims fail

PerAddressTrancheVestingMerkleDistributor.claim always reverts because it checks the Merkle proof incorrectly

In RFPSimpleStrategy, winning bid can use bait-and-switch to increase bid after acceptance and steal funds

In QV strategy, allocators by default get infinite votes

RFPSimpleStrategy.allocate() can be front-run, allowing the someone to bid very low but charge very high

In RFPSimpleStrategy, if pool is not overfunded, payouts past the first will not work

The two RFP sttrategies cannot be used with useRegistry anchor on

QV strategy cannot receive native token

In QV strategy, a clever allocator can get exponentially-many votes

The 1-second overlap between the during- and after-allocation periods may cause funds to become stuck, permanently.

Late-arriving funds to QV strategy can get stuck forever

All strategies except DonationVotingMerkleDistributionDirectTransferStrategy do not work for fee-on-transfer tokens

Changing already-set milestones leads to paying incorrect amount

Problems with tokens that transfer less than amount. (Separate from fee-on-transfer issues!)

Anchor creation and cloneable strategies do not work on zkSync Era

Can steal gOhm by calling Clearinghouse.claimDefaulted on loans not made by Clearinghouse

Calling Cooler.claimDefaulted will lose all unclaimed payments.

gOhm stuck forever if call claimDefaulted on Cooler directly

Recipients in a CrosschainMerkleDistributor can mint themselves arbitrary amounts of voting tokens

setVoteFactor() does not change existing supply of votes. As a result, some may be unable to withdraw.

Because of rounding issues, users may not be able to withdraw airdrop tokens if their claim has been adjust()'ed upwards

Settlement does not pay relayer fee to Connext

liquidate() and claim_funds() track money to be received separately

Late-depositors can claim value intended for earlier depositors

migrate() cannot do anything

Can shut down ProtectionPool late payment logic by dusting purchase of small protections

Lenders are able to purchase protection in excess of their lending position

Consecutive lockings cause capital to be lost forever

Buyer gets free protection during renewal period

Once per cycle, seller can greatly multiply earnings when interest accrues during open period

Buyer can buy protection only for expected payment days by abusing renewals

Protection too expensive when some capital is locked

If unlocked capital in pool falls below minRequiredCapital, then protection can be bought for minimum premium

Post-contest refunds block tier winners in tiered percentage bounty from claiming funds

Rogue token can disable all claims from tiered percentage bounty

Refunds can be disabled by spamming deposits

Can steal funds from other winners in a tiered percentage bounty by sandwhiching closeCompetition with deposit/refund

Can prevent NFT deposits by depositing then refunding NFTs